Showing posts with label methodology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label methodology. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

iPhone - TDEL034 Tool Testing


Many discussions take place during training which unearth useful guidance for practices and procedures. Also, tips and tricks are also revealed. From the MTEB Tool Testing training papers 2015 - iPhone TDEL034 (test device entry level) strategies and pre-planning - it is used to illustrate potential stages for obtaining images that produce a baseline test data to enable repeated testing to identify possible changes in the working operation of forensic tool suites importing a pre-existing test image.

However, TDEL034 is, as stated above, for strategies and pre-planning. Acquisition tools and Analysis (reader/reveal) tools are dealt with later in the training. What is uncovered during discussions are peoples perceptions given their involvement within the examination process. 

It is in these sessions during training the reality dawns as to the time and expense it takes just to deal with one brand-name 'Make' of smartphone and then adding into the equation the various models that have been created and may be created in the future. If that isn't enough, there is then the various versions of OS implemented in various models (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_version_history).

The discovery doesn't end there. Tasks involving removal of barriers and revelation equally may impact when discussing discovery (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_jailbreaking).

Digital forensics is a reality and not a junk science. This field of endeavour is unlike traditional sciences incl. many forensic sciences. How many traditional sciences can you identify evolve and update rapidly e.g. every 6mths-12mths? It is against this backdrop that digital forensics is expected to function and operate across a digital arena of many makes/models of devices and services. Understanding the fantastic job that people do working in digital forensics and battling with constant change illustrates how digital forensics is highly unique.

Generic standards do not work as well with digital forensics as would 'specific' standards. That is because with generic standards they are tantamount to informing everyone this is what has been created and it is your responsibility to make it work. This is analogous to an organisation purchasing a SATNAV and Driving Route System which when operational fails to inform the driver of 'No Entry' roads, dead end roads, instructing a driver to take the action even when the sign states 'No Left Turn' or using as-the-crow-flies navigation so the driver is placed at a point e.g. x-miles from true destination, because the system doesn't understand vehicles cannot drive through people houses, gardens or buildings to get to the other side. The organisation then expects the driver to workout the problems so that when reaching the destination it looks like the SATNAV and Driving Route System was working correctly.

This is why training is essential not just at the tool level, but also at the conceptual level to assist in the design of an examination approach that fits the need of the device and at the same time relieve the pressure placed on the tools that are expected to, alone, get it right. Having the right digital forensic standard should provide the baseline and should define process approach to assist achieve results.

I will return to this subject to offer observations a little later, but for now other matters are now pressing and need attention.

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Threats and Forcing SMS delay

Following my article France Car Shootings and Mobile Evidence http://www.trewmte.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/france-car-shootings-and-mobile-evidence.html an investigator, previously working with a well-known cellular and fixed network manufacturer, confirmed to me the results of an internal forensics investigation which he conducted.


An employee had made threats to a Director. The employee had been found to use a 'prepaid sim' card to send theat messages but added a delay period for the sent messages of 2-hours. The employee then switched OFF the handset and inserted the company SIM card into the same handset which had previously held the prepaid SIM that had sent the threat messages. The handset with the company SIM card in it was then switched ON; the employee claimed not to have been responsible for the threats sent from a different IMSI (SIM card).  The intention of the employee was to mask any connection with the threats. However, tracing the IMSIs of the prepaid SIM card and the company SIM card found both to have been operating in the same handset (IMEI). Such trace capability can be made from enquiries of network databases such as BTS, HLR etc. Moreover with high levels of text messaging that are sent and received whilst roaming there is trace capability that can be made by interrogating CAMEL.

There is also useful data that can be obtained for linking with cell site analysis (CSA), which is a bonus although there appears to be some confusion occuring in the US at the moment as to the value of CSA evidence http://www.forensicfocus.com/Forums/viewtopic/t=9679/ and how the material may be applied on a case by case basis. I am not convinced that licenced operators with highly developed as they are in the US cellular networks simply could not/would not sufficient call record/cell data available to know what is happening when an MS has been active in their networks, about the arrangement at a particular mast (cell tower) as used by an MS, the configuration of the radio network operating at the time an MS has been used and so on.

Monday, September 17, 2012

France Car Shootings and Mobile Evidence

France Car Shootings and Mobile Evidence

It is well known by now that the team investigating the shootings in the French Alps discovered two mobile phones: http://news.sky.com/story/982481/alps-shootings-police-find-two-phones-in-car. The following has nothing to do with the French authorities investigation and does not seek to speculate on what might be. However the case is very useful in that it provides a useful example to apply a conceptual method to seeking out evidence originally discussed in my thread back in January 2009: http://www.trewmte.blogspot.co.uk/2009_01_01_archive.html.

The diagrams below illustrate one method of taking a crime scene event and postulating the possibilities of mobile phone evidence and mobile events that might occur prior to and after e.g. a murder. Yes, it is quite possible that activity on a victim's switched ON mobile phone may still occur after the victim's death. This is in addition to evidence that can accrue when it is switched OFF.  





To assist the investigation to make it a more managable task for this case scenario discussion the investigator/examiner can separate, but without severing the links, the case into four stages:

 i) possible evidence before and leading upto the crime
 ii) possible evidence at the approximate time of (a)shooting, (b)death
iii) possible evidence when attending the scene of crime
 iv) possible evidence that might still be collated post scene of crime 

The depth and breadth of mobile evidence has substantially increased given the evolving and fast developmental pace of mobile technology and services. To try and discuss all of them would over-complicate this discussion, so the discussion will consider the diagram below and highlight possible mobile evidence and events iv).

The previous 2009 discussion (link given above) needs to be read to understand the diagram below, after which an examiner/investigator then begin to recognise where possible post crime mobile evidence might be generated/occur and create a check list of those possibilities.   


Using the 'C now' constant this could represent the position of the investigation in physical space, say where the two mobiles have been recovered but still at the scene of crime. Time is important, too, and therefore the investigator (hypothetically, of course, for this discussion) records a time one-hour after mobile phones recovered at the crime location. This is important for timeline because anything occurring before that time have one set of evidential/event values (prior to approximate time of death) and evidence/events occurring after have another set of evidential values (post approximate time of death). By way of illustrating the latter, the dead victim wont be operating the handset his/herself so that fact is important, but that doesn't exclude the possibility the victim, prior to death, having pre-programmed the handset to do something (e.g. send a birthday text, set an alarm and so on).  

The perpetrator/s fled the crime scene and therefore the time delay occuring between that and the discovered mobile phones could be minutes/hours/days. The race is on to catch up if the investigation is not to be caught up on the tide of diminishing returns. 

The use of text messaging is prolific and therefore knowing which material to discard and which is important evidence is not an easy task. Commonly, texting is perceived on the basis that a user:

- sends and receives texts
- known or unknown called/calling party  
- content based upon 'familiarity' of communicating parties

There is a whole host of investigative information that may need to be practically assessed as to possibility of text occuring on a mobile phone after a victim's death, such as:

- text generated by mobile phone as opposed to text generated on PC sent via the internet e.g: check the SMS header details:

Originating Address type: 91
Type of number: International
Numbering plan identifier: E.164
Originating Address: 44798021XXXX

and where you see 'Originating address' that does not contain the commonly understood mobile telephone number (E.164) but it contains an hex-decimal representation then it might indicate the message originated from the internet. Example

Originating Address type: 91
Type of number: International
Numbering plan identifier: E.164
Originating Address: 35fac2457c0be2008

To start with go back to basics (this is necessary due to the requirements of backward compatibility) and check out GSM standards GSM-0340; 0338, 0411, 0902 etc

- text maybe generated due to a set-calendar event e.g. check user profiling relevant to proactive SIM, STKs and handset calendar

- text may appear as an SMS but what if it is Wi-Fi direct data e.g. depending make/model of mobile phone check settings such as 'wireless and network'

What can happen when received test messages arrive later than the date the text was originated and sent? - http://trewmte.blogspot.co.uk/2007/10/conflicts-call-records-sms-delivery.html - Local and roaming issues maybe relevant?

Check also SMS 'validity period' for sent text messages, thus messages can be held in 'escrow' by a network operator. See GSM 11.11; 3GPP 31102



Additional time values for 'Validity Period' can be found in GSM03.40



There can be other aspects of post-crime related mobile evidence activity on a victim's mobile phone, such as voicemail. Moreover, cell site analysis can have a role here too for a switched ON mobile phones and post-crime generated evidence.

Determining possible evidence and events on a mobile phone or mobile account,, for that matter, which may occur post-crime might be highly beneficial in death, kidnap or missing person cases. 

Sunday, January 04, 2009

Mobile Forensics Discussion Forum

Mobile Forensics Discussion Forum
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I have linked up with Jamie Morris of ForensicFocus (www.forensicfocus.com) to run a Mobile Forensics Discussion Forum. It is high time the profession had such a forum that doesn't require limiting people to join a forum whilst being excluded from other parts of a forum.
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Currently Jamie posed a question in the new forum:
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"Forensic analysis of mobile phone internal memory"
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"I'm interested in how current practice in mobile phone forensic memory analysis reflects or differs from the paradigm and procedure(s) discussed in Svein Y. Willassen's paper here (PDF). All thoughts and comments welcome! Jamie"
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I have posted my reply, albeit rather long, which is below. If you want to join the discussion it is going on at http://www.forensicfocus.com/index.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=3335 right now, so join in.
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Greg Smith reply to Jamie Morris
There are some interesting reports that have been written regarding recovery of deleted data from mobile telephone flash memory chips and they all make a useful contribution in this field of examination.
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I do have my suspicions about the way in which deleted data recovery from mobile telephones is being conducted and the need to be conducting such a process on anything that looks like a mobile telephone.
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Jamie, as you started the discussion about methodology then I'll add my 2p worth.
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Extracting and harvesting physical data as opposed to logical data needs to be balanced between methodology vis-a-vis forensic standards and evidential admissibility. Different countries have different requirements, rules and laws when it comes to deleted data. In the UK there are many issues surrounding 'interference with goods', single and both party 'consent', 'collateral intrusion', damage etc etc.
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As there are numerous articles that have been written in examination terms about the methods to recover deleted data, forensics and evidence equally demands to learn of the problems with using certain methods to comprehend whether these methods should be used in the first place and how reliable they are? For instance, rarely do reports record what faults they found in the methodology, the problems occurred, the time the method takes etc etc.Looking at problems associated with damage and damage avoidance when discuss methodology:
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SIM Cards
Can we learn anything from damage SIM Cards? Let's take the issue of acid etching used on an ICC card to get at the microprocessor inside (eg method used due to the contact legs having been broken; normal boot up of the ICC isn't possible) in order to read the SIM. This process is not quick and certainly is not suited to production run (bang it on bang it out, style of thinking). The microprocessor may be exposed to ESD, poor handling or something else. If this happens the examiner may not get any data but also it prevents anyone else being able to examine the SIM independently.
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Handset Flash Chips
Issues of damage can arise when dealing with removing and replacing flash memory chips on mobile telephone circuit boards. De-soldering and re-balling are not easy, no matter how a report presents the subject as easy. It is a skilled artform that takes time and patience to acquire the routine to perfect re-balling, for example. What happens when the examiner breaks a flash chip contact pin when physically lifting the chip off the board because de-soldering wasn't performed correctly? Alternatively, poor re-balling technique can lead to dry-joints or a loose contact pin in the grid-array that might cause intermittent faults.
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Whilst talking about flash memory chip removal, ask the question why is it necessary to remove the chip in the first place? Are the deleted data really necessary? Many of you may be familiar with the term JTAG points on a mobile phone. Many of you may be aware that using the JTAG points may alter data in RAM and at the Flash Translation Layer (FTL) where some implement automated data-maintenance operations, such as wear-leveling etc, that can be activated. Thus removing the chip is meant to assist avoid that happening. Okay, so now the chip has been removed (and leaving aside the issues of actually interrogating the chip, imaging and harvesting data) the chip needs to be re-balled (replaced) at the end of the examination. How do you know that the mobile phone will work properly again having replaced the chip? Switching ON the mobile telephone to check if it works? Hang on, that cannot be right? The chip was removed in the first place to avoid altering data etc. By the same token, a mobile telephone cannot be handed back to its owner in a disassembled or damaged state because not every suspect is sent to court or found guilty.
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Apart from the above issues, is the technique of recovery of deleted data absolutely necessary for every case and how might that be handled?
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Is there a mass market for deleted data as evidence?
Many years ago I worked in the type approvals of telecommunication equipment marketplace, whilst my fledging career into forensics and evidence was still beginning. As a type approvals consultant, I visited with my clients factories in the UK and the Far East and learned a tremendous amount about equipment production and repairing of devices. De-soldering and re-balling I learned use resources that are time-greedy and specialist equipment handling surface-mounted technology was needed where large quantities of device components needed to be removed and replaced on the board. It also required removing the PCBs out of their casings (screws etc) and disconnection of leads from LEDs/LCDs etc, which required a human workforce.
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To run the same operation for seized mobile telephones as evidence would be difficult, time consuming and costly. Outsourcing the work overseas to get cheap human labour could be fraught with problems. Not least of which it could be tantamount to allowing evidence to leave a country, potentially to a country not governed by the laws etc of the country where the evidence had been seized, only to find loss of jurisdiction and/or no way of tracing how the evidence has been handled or what treatment it has received whilst overseas.Outsourcing overseas has other problems, as well, as it can to lead to job losses and not job creation in the country where the evidence was seized and costs paid to outsourcers overseas impacts by not benefiting the home economy overall, due to finances flowing away from the country and not circulating in it. Another side impact is brain-drain of knowledge, because home-grown talent would obviously find less work and move elsewhere or go and learn new skills and drop the old skill. Also countries that outsourced tended to find they are held to ransom down the line as no knowledge and skill remained in the home country.
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The above is obviously a macro view applied to a micro practise limited to recovering deleted data from evidence by removing flash memory chips. Macro methodology for removing chips and harvesting deleted data wouldn't appear to be sustainable because only a small amount of work is undertaken that relates to deleted data evidence, apart from the issue that a safe forensic method for deleted data recovery acquired on a production line assembly might be hard to achieve. From a UK perspective there should be really no need for every case to have every handset's flash chip removed to recover deleted data or the need for outsourcing overseas or deleted data recovery production line assemblies.
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Observations
Quite often when examination and methodology are discussed the above issues are rarely included in those discussions. That may be because it may be some do not see them as important, a work-around has already been achieved, the issues are not known or some may not see them as relevant at all. I do see the above issues as relevant and needing to be aired and discussed, as they highlight that associated with extracting and harvesting deleted data there are numerous pitfalls that can occur and proportionality in using this recovery method and the use of deleted data anyway hasn't been fully justified.
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On another occasion it would be useful also to discuss the value of deleted data and its accuracy and relevance.